

Research Article

The Authority of Analogical Reasoning from the Seen to the Unseen (Qiyās al-ghāib ‘alā al-shāhid) for Understanding the Attributes of God According to Qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār

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Abstract. Understanding the attributes of God has long been a contentious issue among Muslim scholars, persisting as a central theological debate. This polemic fundamentally revolves around the interpretation of religious texts (*Dilalah Alfadz ala Ma’aani*). Numerous Muslim scholars have proposed alternative approaches to interpret the divine attributes in the Qur'an, aiming to preserve meaning while preventing readers from anthropomorphism (*Tashbih*). Consequently, two key principles have emerged for understanding ambiguous (*mutashabihat*) verses: first, delegating the

interpretation (*tafwidh*) of such verses to God while affirming His transcendence; and second, selecting contextually appropriate meanings for divine attributes based on a range of arguments, thus avoiding anthropomorphic misinterpretations. Despite the continued teaching of these methods, the debate remains vigorous among theologians. The core of this controversy lies in the tendency to understand God by analogy to observable phenomena (*Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*), which often results in the flawed application of *Qiyas Tamsili*. This underscores the need for an in-depth study of *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*, emphasizing proper principles (*Dhawabit*) to prevent misunderstandings as anthropomorphic analogy. Qadi Abdul Jabbar (d. 1052 CE) offers significant guidance on employing *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid* to avoid *Tashbih* when discussing God and His attributes. There are compelling academic reasons to study Qadi Abdul Jabbar's approach in this context. First, his interpretation avoids a literal understanding of divine attributes, thus averting paradoxes and contradictions. Second, Qadi Abdul Jabbar advocates for objectivity (*inshof*) in applying *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*, exemplified in his rejection of negative attributes, such as "the Avenger" (*Al Muntaqim*), which he argues detract from divine perfection. Instead, he applies this method to clarify God's justice. This research adopts a literature review approach, focusing on Qadi Abdul Jabbar's major works, *Sharh Usl al-Khamsah* and *Al-Mughni fi Abwab al-Tawhid*, alongside other relevant sources to deepen the understanding of this theme.

Keywords: Tashbih, Dhawabith, Tafwid, Ta'wil, Qiyas Ghaib ala shahid, Qadi Abd Al jabbar

Abstrak. Pemahaman tentang sifat – sifat Tuhan telah lama menjadi polemic sarjana Muslim hingga saat ini, jika kita telisik lebih dalam titik tengkar pemahaman tersebut ada pada ma'na daripada teks – teks keagamaan yang ada (*Dilalah Alfadz ala Ma'aani*). Pada konteks ini banyak sarjana muslim memberikan sebuah alternative bagaimana kemudian sifat – sifat Tuhan yang ada pada Al Qu'ran dipahami sesuai dengan ma'nanya sekaligus menjaga kesalahan seorang pembaca dari antroporism (*Tasybih*) sehingga kemudian menghasilkan dua rumusan penting dalam memahami ayat – ayat *mutashabihat* yaitu dengan menyerahkan Ma'na ayat kepada Tuhan dan tetap meyakini perbedaan Tuhan dengan Mahluk Nya (*Tafwidh*) dan Memilih ma'na kata yang sesuai untuk Tuhan dengan melihat berbagai macam argument – argument yang ada sehingga ayat tersebut tidak dipahami secara antroporism akan tetapi walaupun keduanya masih diajarkan hingga kini pada kenyataan nya polemic tersebut masih menjadi perdebatan hangat kalangan teolog. Hal tersebut bermula dari bagaimana seorang memahami Tuhan dengan menggunakan apa yang ada di sekelilingnya (*Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*) sehingga kemudian banyak teolog terjebak pada *Qiyas Tamsili* pada prakteknya sehingga perlu dilakukan kajian yang mendalam tentang bagaimana Qiyas Ghaib ala shahid dipahami dan diperlukan adanya sebuah kaidah (*Dhawabith*) pada penggunaannya agar kemudian tidak disalahpahami sebagai *Qiyas Tamsili*. Qadi Abdul Jabbar (w.1052 M) memberikan sebuah panduan tentang penggunaan *Qiyas Ghaib Ala shahid* Agar seorang tidak terjerumus dalam *Tasybih* ketika membahas Tuhan beserta sifat – sifat Nya. Setidaknya da beberapa alasan akademik kenapa Pemikiran Qadi Abd Al jabbar perlu dikaji lebih mendalam dalam konteks ini. Yang pertama, Qadi Abdul jabbar cenderung menghindari interpretasi literal dalam memahami sifat – sifat Tuhan sehingga tidak terjebak dalam paradoks dan kontraiksi dalam memahaminya. Alasan yang kedua, Qadi Abdul jabbar berusaha untuk objektif (*inshof*) dalam menggunakan *Qiyas Ghaib ala syahid* pada sifat – sifat Tuhan hal ini nampak pada penolakannya terhadap sifat - sifat Tuhan yang berbasis atribut negatif seperti Maha Menyiksa (*Al Muntaqim*) menurutnya hal tersebut justru akan menunjukan ketidak sempuraan Tuhan. Sedangkan menggunakan metode itu dalam menjelaskan keadilan Tuhan. Penelitian ini menggunakan studi kepustakaan dengan merujuk pada kitab *Sharh Usl Al Khamsah* dan kitab *Al Mughni Fi Abwab Al Tauhid* sebagai *Magnum Opus* Dari Qadi Abd Al Jabr beserta Refrensi lain yang terkait dengan tema tersebut.

Kata kunci : Tashbih, Dhawabith, Tafwid, Ta'wil, Qiyas Ghaib ala shahid, Qadi Abd Al jabbar

INTRODUCTION

The concept of God's dissimilarity from His creation (Mukhalafatn al hawadis) has been a central theme in discussions for centuries. While everyone agrees on the impossibility of God resembling His creation, there are disagreements about how this concept can actually be explained and applied to humans. It is not feasible to impose a specific framework on people with different backgrounds. On the other hand, there are Quranic verses that explicitly describe God as a supernatural force with attributes that resemble His creation (*auham al-tashbih*), which has led to various reactions from Muslim scholars. In addressing and resolving the issues that arise from this, these scholars developed their own methodologies and distinct approaches, eventually forming different schools of kalam (Islamic theology), each with its unique characteristics. These theological schools, in general, can be categorized into two main approaches regarding their understanding of God's attributes, particularly concerning the ambiguous (*mutashabihat*) verses.¹

The first school submits all interpretations (*Tafwidh*) of such verses to God, while maintaining the belief that it is impossible for God to have any resemblance to His creation in any way. The absence of explicit explanations from the Prophet regarding the meaning of these verses serves as a key argument for the proponents of Tafwidh, who refrain from delving deeply into interpreting the ambiguous (*mutashabihat*) verses. Additionally, this view argues that these ambiguous verses are a test of faith from God to humanity. Given the limitations of human understanding in comprehending the messages of the Qur'an, not all divine messages can be fully grasped by humans.

Initially, the school of Tafwidh emerged from a literal and straightforward mode of thinking,² based on the premise that it is impossible for a term (word) in the Qur'an to carry a meaning different from what the Quraysh Arabs understood at the time when the Qur'an was revealed. This group also accepts the dictum that if the explicit meaning of the Qur'an contradicts the understanding of the Arabs at that time or conflicts with human practical reason, then the verses must have an implicit (*Ta'wil*) meaning.³ However, choosing one meaning among the various interpretations of a term in the Qur'an requires evidence. The selection of a meaning for a word in the Qur'an is the work (*ijtihad*) of the interpreters (*mufasssirun*). Since

¹ Abd Al Shamad Al Falimbani, *syarah Jauhar Al Tauhid* (Surabaya: Al hidayah, 2017), 47.

² Abu Bakr Ahmad Al bayhaqi, *Asma wa shifat* (Beirut: Dar Al Taqwa, 2018), 332. See also: Abu Abd illah Ala' Al ddiin Al Bukhari, *Risalah Al I'tiqod* (Alkuwait: Dar al baydha, 2019), 121.

³ Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, *Iljam Al awam* (Istanbul: Haiah Al ta'lif Ismailaga, 2014), 25. See also: Abu bakr Al Sham ad din ad dhahabi, *Al Uluw* (Beirut: Dar Al Kutub Al alamiah, 2012), 207.

ijtihad is by nature subjective, it is impossible for interpretations to be uniform or definitive (*qat'i dilalah*). Thus, ultimately submitting the meaning of these verses to God is considered correct.

The concept of ***Tafwidh*** as a methodology (*Manhaj*) for understanding ambiguous (*mutashabihat*) verses was not explicitly found during the Prophet's time. However, there are implicit indications (mafhum) from hadiths and interpretations by the Companions suggesting that the meanings of such verses should be left to God. This concept of Tafwidh emerged alongside the development of the Islamic community and the codification of various Islamic sciences. Tafwidh as a systematic approach for understanding *mutashabihat* verses only began to appear around a hundred years after the death of the Prophet. Its emergence is marked by discussions (questions and answers) between teachers and students concerning the meaning of these ambiguous verses.

Al-Bayhaqi (d. 384 H) documented in his book that Al-Waleed ibn Muslim (d. 185 H) recorded questions regarding the meanings of ambiguous hadiths that were posed to several scholars, including Laith ibn Saad (d. 175 H), Al-Awzai (d. 157 H), Al-Thawri (d. 161 H), and Malik ibn Anas (d. 179 H). All of them responded with the statement: "Just believe as it is written, without delving into its reality."⁴ What is noteworthy here is that when Al-Waleed relayed this to his student Haysam ibn Al-Kharjah (d. 227 H), he used the passive verb form (*shighat fi'il mabni lil-majhul*). In Arabic, passive verbs are often employed to indicate something widely known or commonly understood, rendering it unnecessary to mention the subject (*fa'il*) explicitly. The passive form is also used when the speaker does not want to focus on who exactly posed the question to the scholars about the meaning of ambiguous texts, but rather to emphasize the opinions of the early scholars (*salaf*) as the main point (*mura'ah ghardi al-sami'*). Sometimes, passive verbs are used to imply blame or disapproval of the subject (*fa'il*) of an action, which is why mentioning the name might be omitted (*ihmal dhikri fa'ilihi*).⁵ To analyze these three possibilities, it is necessary to consider the social context in which Al-Waleed lived. This is important for understanding when Tafwidh was first used to interpret *mutashabihat* verses and when it became a complete, structured, and comprehensive method for interpreting such verses.

Al-Waleed ibn Muslim lived during the early emergence of various Islamic sects. He witnessed the political upheavals within the Islamic community, which also marked the initial rise of anthropomorphism (*tashbih and tajsim*) in Islamic thought. History records that the issue of anthropomorphism initially arose among Shi'ite circles before spreading more widely among Sunni communities.⁶ Hisham ibn Al-Hakam (d. 179 H) was the first to describe God as a "supernatural being with a height

⁴ Abu Bakr Ahmad Al bayhaqi, *Sunan Al kubra*, Vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar kutub Al Alamiah, 2007),4.

⁵ Abd Al Qahir Al jurjani, *Dalail I'jaz* (Cairo: Maktabah Al Khanji, 1984), 264.

⁶ Abu Al manshur Al Bagdadi, *Al Firaq Baina Al firaq* (Cairo: Dar Al balad, 2015) 267.

of seventy spans (*shibr*).⁷ Hisham's statement seemed to cause an uproar in the community, prompting Imam Musa Al-Kadhim (d. 183 H) to forbid Hisham ibn Al-Hakam from discussing theology (*Ilm al-Kalam*).⁸ At this point, we can understand why Al-Waleed chose to use the passive verb (سُئِلَ) instead of an active verb, as the issue of anthropomorphism (*tajsim*) had already become a public concern at the time. Thus, naming the person who asked the question would have been of little benefit. Furthermore, the political context of the time cannot be ignored, as the issue of anthropomorphism originally developed among the Shi'ites, who were political rivals of the Sunni authorities in power. Hence, those questioning such matters were likely Shi'ites, making it unwise or unnecessary to mention their names during a politically sensitive period.

Early Muslim thinkers, both Sunni and Shi'a, particularly among the hadith scholars, did not seem particularly interested in addressing issues of anthropomorphism. Instead, they preferred to leave the meanings to God and focus on other areas of knowledge. Consequently, *Tafwidh* as a concept was not fully developed until Imam Ghazali (d. 505 H) provided principles on how a *Mufawwidh* (one who practices *Tafwidh*) should engage with the verses, the Companions, and the best generations of the Muslim community in understanding religion, especially concerning ambiguous (*mutashabihat*) verses. According to Al-Ghazali, *Tafwidh* must adhere to four main principles. First, when one chooses the methodology of *Tafwidh*, it must be based on the correct creed (*aqidah*) that it is impossible for God to resemble His creation (*Taqdis*). Thus, when the Prophet mentions ambiguous texts, it could not have been with the intent of anthropomorphism. Second, one must have faith in the text (*Tasdhiq*). While belief is impossible without some understanding of what is believed, and it is impossible to affirm something without having a prior concept of it (*istihala al-tasdiq bila al-tasawur*), this does not negate the possibility of general affirmation (*tasdiq al-ijmali*). The existence of words with homonymous meanings (*mushtarak al-ma'na*) should no longer be questioned (it is axiomatic), with each word indicating different meanings. Third, one should acknowledge their own limitations in understanding God's words (*al-i'tiraf bil-ajz*). Forcing oneself to comprehend the meanings of ambiguous verses will only obscure their meaning further. Therefore, recognizing the inability to fully grasp the meanings of such verses and leaving them unknown is a recognition of one's limitations, and this is part of understanding itself (*ajz 'an al-idrak idrak*). In this case, it is proper to leave the interpretation to those who are experts in the field (*al-taslim li ahli al-ma'rifah*).⁹

⁷ Abu Al manshur Al Baghdadi, *Al Firaq Baina Al firaq* (Cairo: Dar Al balad, 2015) 267.

⁸ Abu Ja'far Muhammad Al Thusi, *ikhtiyar li ma'rifah al rijal*, Vol. 1 (Mashad: Bichar Rashid, 1421H) 269. See Also: Shaykh Al Mufid, *Fushul Al Mukhtarah*, Vol. 1 (Mehr: Mua'sasah Al Imam Al shadiq, 1413 H) 52.

⁹ Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, *Iljam Al awam* (Istanbul: Hai'ah Al ta'lif Ismailaga, 2014), 87.

The simplicity of the concept of Tafwidh protects a *mufasssir* (interpreter), in particular, and a Muslim, in general, from errors in understanding God's attributes. Furthermore, it does not require complex reasoning. However, the simplicity of Tafwidh also makes it difficult to use as an argument (*hujjah*) against those who deny it. Scholars have tried to overcome this limitation by seeking meanings appropriate to God while still adhering to the principles of exegesis and the Arabic language. This method later became known as *Ta'wil*. In the *Ta'wil* methodology, scholars emphasize aligning the meaning with the wording in the Qur'an. If the meaning is interpreted literally according to the apparent words of the verse (*dhahir*), contradictions would arise. Such contradictions would lead to anthropomorphism in relation to God's attributes, which is impermissible.

The scholars who advocated this method sought to ensure that when a *mufasssir* (interpreter) interprets the Qur'an, they do not do so based on their own desires and whims. The Prophet warned against interpreting the Qur'an solely based on one's own opinions, meaning without using any proper methodology of interpretation.¹⁰ The purpose of *ta'wil* (allegorical interpretation) is to uncover a meaning that is appropriate for Allah Most High and to clarify the most suitable meaning (*rajih*) among the possible interpretations. In the method of *ta'wil*, at least two elements must be observed: purifying Allah from any resemblance to His creation (*al-tanzih*) and affirming what Allah has revealed in the Qur'an (*ithbat*). The aspect of *al-tanzih* is emphasized in *ta'wil* because it not only explains the meaning of a verse but also serves as a rebuttal (*ilzam al-khusum*) against deviant groups. *Ta'wil* as a method of interpreting the Qur'an has existed since the time of the Companions. This can be traced through various texts that explain how some Companions of the Prophet interpreted the Qur'an allegorically.

Ibn Abbas (d. 68 H) is recorded as one of the first to perform *ta'wil* of the Qur'an. He interpreted the term *Kursiy* in the Qur'an as representing the knowledge of God.¹¹ While linguistically *kursi* refers to something used for sitting, another interpretation of the root (*wazan*) of the word *kursi* derives from the letters *kaf*, *ra*, and *shin*. Arabs used this word for something genuine and not fabricated, and the learned individuals were also referred to as *al-kursy*.¹² Based on this, Ibn Abbas chose the meaning of knowledge to interpret *Kursy*. However, if we compare the time in which Ibn Abbas lived with the period when anthropomorphism (*tajsim*) began to emerge in Islam, we find a significant gap between his time and the fitnah of anthropomorphism, which arose about a hundred years after Ibn Abbas's death.

¹⁰ Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, *Ihya ulumuddin*, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar Al Kotoob Al Alamiah, 2009), 56.

¹¹ Muhammad Ibn Jarir Al Thabary, *Jami' Al Bayan 'an Ta'wil Al Qur'an*, Vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar Al kotob, 2005), 7.

¹² Khalil Ibn Ahmad, *Mu'jam Al Ain*, Vol. 5 (Cairo: Dar wa Maktabah Al hilal, 2001) 308. See Also: Ahmad Ibn Faris, *Mu'jam maqayis Al Lughah*, Vol. 5 (Beirut: Dar Al kotoob, 2011), 169.

Thus, it becomes clear that Ibn Abbas's *ta'wil* was not related to the anthropomorphic issues propagated by Hisham ibn Hakam.

Al-Thawri (d. 161 H) interpreted *istiwa'* (God's rising) as submission to God (*Al qasd Bi Amrihi*),¹³ while Imam Malik ibn Anas (d. 179 H) interpreted *nuzul* (descent) as the descent of Allah's mercy (His command descends) rather than God Himself physically descending, since God does not occupy a place or move from one location to another.¹⁴ From this, we can see that *ta'wil* became a specific method for understanding the Qur'anic verses related to God's attributes, and it provides historical evidence of when *ta'wil* and *tafwidh* began to be used as approaches to interpreting ambiguous verses.

The expansion of Islam into non-Arab regions led to cultural assimilation and acculturation in the conquered territories. This often extended to religious matters, raising new theological issues. For example, the question of whether the Qur'an, as the word (*kalam*) of God, is eternal like God or created, was an issue that had already existed in Christianity long before it arose in Islam. In Christianity, the debate centered around the status of Jesus (Isa), while in Islam, it concerned the divine nature of the Qur'an. In such cases, leaving the meaning of *Kalamullah* (the word of God) as it is without further interpretation (*tafwidh*) would not resolve the issue. Thus, many scholars chose *ta'wil* to avoid ambiguities and respond to the theological challenges of the time. This situation led to *tafwidh* being largely abandoned by Islamic scholars, especially since the Mu'tazilite scholars, who opposed *tafwidh*, gained support from the authorities, making the concept less popular among scholars.

The *Mufawwidhah* group (those who advocate *tafwidh*) often accuse those who practice *ta'wil* of denying God's attributes (*mu'attilah*), especially considering the large number of verses that speak about God's attributes, which they argue cannot all be understood metaphorically. They often fall into the error of *qiyas ghaib ala shahid* (analogizing the unseen to the seen), and thus claim that those who perform *ta'wil* of God's attributes are trapped in their own reasoning.¹⁵ However, acknowledging the existence of *mutashabih* (ambiguous) verses and affirming God's *sifat khabariyah* (informative attributes) does not mean believing that God is corporeal (*jism*). After all, the consequences of a belief are not the belief itself (*lawazim mazhab laisa bimazhab*).

Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is a method of reasoning often used by Muslim theologians in debates with their opponents when discussing theological issues. Etymologically, it refers to an analogy based on something that can be perceived by

¹³ Nur Al Din Muhammad Al Kori, *Muraqat Al mafatih*, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar Al fikr, 2003), 137.

¹⁴ Abu Umar Ibn Abd Al Bar, *Al Tamhid Lima fi Al Muwatha'*, Vol. 7 (London: Mua'assis Al Furqan, 2017) 143. See also: Abu bakr Al Sham ad din ad dhahabi, *Syi'ar A'lam Al Nubala*, Vol. 8 (Cairo: Al Risalah, 2017) 185.

¹⁵ Ibn Rusyd, *Al Kasyf An manahij Al adillah* (Cairo: Markaz Al Dirosah Al wihdah, 2009), 36.

the senses (*shahid*) in comparison to something that is imperceptible to the senses (*ghaib*). Some scholars further explain that *shahid* refers to something whose meaning is clear and evident, such that a person who understands *shahid* is assumed to also understand *ghaib*. Here, *ghaib* is considered the opposite of *shahid*—if *shahid* means something known either with certainty or only with conjecture (*ma'lum wa mashkuk fihi*), then *ghaib* refers to something unknown or beyond a scholar's knowledge (*dihab al-'alim 'an al-'ilmi bihi*).¹⁶ Philosophers define *ghaib* as the absence of something in its place, meaning it exists either naturally, habitually, or intellectually.¹⁷

In this context, *shahid* refers to knowledge or information that is certain, corresponding to the philosophers' view that *ghaib* and *shahid* are particular matters (*juz'i*) closely linked to the identity of something itself. A person's knowledge about something is essentially particular, and such particular knowledge cannot yield certainty (*'ilm al-yaqin*) unless a universal principle (*qa'idah kulliyyah*) is established that encompasses the particulars.

Epistemologically, scholars differ in their understanding of *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*, due to the similarity between this analogy and *Qiyas Tamsili* (representational analogy). Philosophers and Hanbali scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah argue that *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid* and *Qiyas Tamsili* are essentially the same, as both are forms of reasoning derived from inductive observation (*juz'iyyah*).¹⁸ An example of this is the analogy between the sky and a house: both are considered to be created (*huduth*) since they are material and shaped (*mutashakil*). From this, the conclusion is drawn that the sky is also created because it is material and has a form.

In this case, the house represents the *asl* (original case) used in the analogy, making it *shahid*, while the sky is the *furu'* (derived case) and *ghaib*. The *illah* (reason) for both is that they are material and shaped (*mutashakil*). Philosophers argue that in Islamic law (*shari'ah*), *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid* is often used to understand the attributes of God. According to them, to deny material attributes (*jism*) to God, one must demonstrate the existence of something immaterial, since scholars primarily understand things through *Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid*.¹⁹ According to Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini (d. 1028), even the slightest resemblance (*mushabahah*) between two entities in the realm of *shahid* is enough to justify applying the same ruling in the

¹⁶ Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, *Al Mustasfa*, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar Al Shadr, 2011), 238.

¹⁷ Ibnu Sina, *Al ishrrat Wa Al tanbihat*, (Tehran: Dar Ilm, 1983) 352. See also : Abu Al walid ahmad, *Fasl Al maqal fi ma baina Al hikmah wal al shariah*, (Amman: Wizarah Al Tsaqafah Urdun, 2009) , 67.

¹⁸ Ibn Rusyd, *Al Kasyf An manahij Al adillah* (Cairo: Markaz Al Dirosah Al wihdah, 2009)206. See also: dar Taqi Ad din Ahmad ibn Taymiyah, *Dar Al Ta'arud Al aql Wan Naql*, Vol.2 (Cairo: Dar al hadits, 2010)32. See Also: Ibnu sina, *Al Isharat wa'l tanbihat*, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar Al Kotoob, 2019), 343.

¹⁹ Ibn Rusyd, *Al Kasyf An manahij Al adillah* (Cairo: Markaz Al Dirosah Al wihdah, 2009), 188-189.

realm of ghaib.²⁰ This means that if two things are related physically (shahadah), then the same will be true metaphysically (ghaib).

However, such resemblance risks equating God with His creation, as God is self-sufficient and does not require a place, unlike substances (jawhar) that stand independently, which are distinct from accidents (arad) that cannot exist without an entity to reside in. Essentially, according to philosophers and some theologians, Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid and Qiyas Tamsili are the same, differing only in terminology. Moreover, the conditions and requirements for Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid also apply to Qiyas Tamsili, leaving no fundamental difference between them.

Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence refer to it as Qiyas (analogy), while in the study of usul al-din (theology), this type of reasoning is called al-istidlal, both referring to the same concept—an inductive reasoning method that indicates a similarity (tashabuh) through indicative signs (dilalah). In this context, dilalah means an intermediary, understanding something through another thing (fahmu amrin min amr), where the first thing is called madlul (the indicated) and the second is called dal (the indicator). In this context, dal functions as a pointer to derive a scientific conclusion in reasoning. If the process of deriving the dalil follows the correct method in line with established principles, it will lead to a correct conclusion. Thus, the dal must be clearer than the madlul. Since dal serves as a pointer, it must retain this quality, and both the dal and the madlul are necessarily connected (talazum), although this connection does not require absolute certainty but rather a potential one.

Regarding its source, dalil is divided into two types: those based on pure rational reasoning (naqli) and those derived from repeated experience, thus regarded as necessary (adi). Sources of knowledge in Islamic epistemology come from reasoning (aql), sensory perception, or khabar mutawatir (reliable transmission). However, scholars such as Qadi Abd al-Jabbar Al-Mu'tazili (d. 1025 CE) and Imam al-Haramayn (d. 1085 CE) strongly reject equating Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid with Qiyas Tamsili in theology, particularly in understanding God's attributes. They argue that such an analogy leads to disbelief (kufr) and heresy (zindiq),²¹ as God cannot be compared to humans in any way. Even if something appears similar to God in a single aspect (nazhir), this similarity exists only in the term or in something conceptual, meaning it has no real external existence, such as God being the Provider (al-Razzaq), the One who causes death (al-Mumit), or the One who gives life (al-Muhyi). These attributes are manifestations of God's omnipotence and will, not physical realities (wujud fi al-kharij).

²⁰ Syaif Al din Al Amidi, *Abkar Al Afkar Fi Ushul Al din*, Vol 1 (Beirut: Dar Al Kotoob Al l'Imiyyah, 2009), 213-218.

²¹ Abd Al Malik Al Juwayni, *Al Irsyad Ila Qawati' Al Adillah* (Beirut: Dar Al Kotoob Al l'Imiyyah, 2019), 39.

The most fundamental difference between the two methods lies in the way the ‘illah (reason) is determined (masalik al-‘illah). In Qiyas Tamsili, the ‘illah is found through examination and classification (al-sibr wa al-taqsim), where a mujtahid (independent jurist) seeks various possible qualities (ihtimalat) between the asl (original case) and far’ (derived case) and then selects one probability to serve as the ‘illah in the process of syllogistic reasoning. In contrast, the method of determining the ‘illah used in Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid cannot be applied here because the two entities (God and His creation) are fundamentally different. God and His creation are incomparable and have no commonality (mubayanah). This contrasts with the views of some Hanbali scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah, who applied Qiyas al-Tamsil to understand God’s perfection.²² According to him, the perfection that exists in creation also applies, to an even greater extent, to God. If creation is perfect in its knowledge, then God is even more perfect. Likewise, anything negated from creation must also be negated from God, but to a higher degree.

Qadi Abd al-Jabbar argues that this type of reasoning cannot achieve certainty (yaqin),²³ as Qiyas Tamsili, commonly used by usul scholars in formulating legal rulings, differs from Qiyas Mantiqi (logical analogy). In Qiyas Mantiqi, the two propositions are united by a middle term (had awsath) and determined by the relational connection (nisbah) between the premises. The relationship between the minor premise (had asghar) and the middle term (had awsath) is a relationship between something particular (juz’i) and something universal (kulli). The had awsath is universal and encompasses the had asghar, but not the other way around. The had asghar, even though it is universal, does not encompass the meaning of the had awsath—this is like the relationship between humans and animals, where all humans are animals, but not all animals are humans. In Qiyas Mantiqi, the relationship between asl and far’ is described as ‘umum wa al-khusus min wajh (a general-specific relationship), where both the asl and far’ are universal, but part of one applies to the other. For example, “black” can be used for a human, and “human” can also be applied to “black.” These two terms can be separated in meaning, as in the case of a “black stone” and a “white human.” In Qiyas Tamsili Ushuli (representational analogy in legal reasoning), however, the relationship between the asl and far’ is one of contrast and difference (tabayun wa takhaluf).

Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's perspective is intriguing to study because, while he strongly rejects the use of Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid in theological matters, he frequently employs it to explain God's attributes, such as in the case of shifat ma'ani (attributes of meaning). In the Qur'an, God is described as having the ability to hear (al-Sami'), see (al-Basir), and possess knowledge (al-'Ilm). To protect the creed from anthropomorphism, the Mu'tazilites argue that these attributes must be identical

²² Ahmad ibn abd Alhalim, Alharani. *Masalah huduts Al Alam* (Beirut: Dar Al Bashair, 2012), 43.

²³ Abd Al jabar, *Al Majmu' Fi Al Muhith Bi Al Taklif*, Vol.1 (Beirut: Al Matbaah Alkathulikiyah, 2007), 257.

with God's essence ('ayn dhat), meaning that God hears with His essence itself. These attributes cannot be understood as accidental properties (laysa dhat), as that would imply composition in God (tajsim). Anything that is composed and changes cannot be eternal (qadim), and if that were the case, then Allah would not be God.²⁴ According to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, any essence that has accidents (aradh) is necessarily created and dependent on something else (qiyamuhu bi al-ghayr). The separation of attributes from God's essence implies the existence of another entity that is equally eternal as God. Furthermore, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar emphasizes that in the material world (al-shahid), we cannot find an entity that possesses knowledge (alim bi al-'ilm) or power (qadir bi al-qudrah) unless it is corporeal, because both of these attributes are accidents, and accidents cannot exist independently without a form or substance to reside in. If corporeality (jism) is the cause (illah) in the material world, then it must also apply in the unseen realm (ghaib). Therefore, attributing shifat ma'ani to God indirectly implies ascribing corporeality (jism) to Him.²⁵

In addition to the shifat ma'ani, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar also employs Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid to understand God's justice. He argues that the concepts of ignorance and oppression (al-safah wa dzulm) are understood axiomatically by humans. In daily life, a person intuitively grasps the meaning of wrongful actions from others, and what they witness (al-shahid) of a person's evil deeds cannot be attributed to God. Anyone who attributes such actions to God is essentially describing Him as ignorant and oppressive.²⁶ Likewise, people know axiomatically that it is wrong for a person to harm themselves or others without a valid reason. If that is the case, then it is certain that God does not punish His creation without a valid purpose. Anyone who denies this is essentially accusing God of injustice.

Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, as a Mu'tazilite and a representative of the rationalist approach to interpreting ambiguous verses (ayat mutashabihat) and God's attributes (ta'wil), encourages us to explore how Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is understood by Muta'awilin (those who perform allegorical interpretation) and the principles (dhawabith) of Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid according to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. Dhawabit refers to specific general principles that apply to a single subject matter, different from broader principles (qaidah) which encompass the entirety of topics within a particular field of knowledge.

²⁴ Abi Alhasan, Abd Al Jabbar, *Sharh Ushul Al Khamsah* (Cairo: Maktabah Al wahbah, 208) 162. See also: Abd Al jabar, *Al Majmu' Fi Al Muhith Bi Al Taklif*, Vol.1 (Beirut: Al Matbaah Al kathulikiyah, 2007) 43.

²⁵ Op, cit. Vol 2. 465.

²⁶ Abi Alhasan Abd Al Jabbar, *Al mughni Fi Abwab Al Tauhid Wal Al Adl*, Vol. 8 (Cairo: Dar Al Mishriyah, 1981) 521.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Previously, there have been several studies discussing related topics, such as the one conducted by Mustafa Azizi,²⁷ which focuses on the application of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** in theology and the perspectives of various Islamic groups on it. In his study, the author limits the scope to four theological groups, which he considers to be the root of today's Islamic sects. These groups are the **Imamiyyah** (Shia), **Mu'tazilah**, **Ash'arites**, and **Salafis**. In reality, these four groups all recognize the validity (*hujjah*) of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid**, but the study does not elaborate on the principles (*dhawabith*) of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** in theology. The second study is a journal article written by Hasan Al-Khataf, which discusses the influence of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** on the mindset of Mu'tazilite scholars. This journal represents the Mu'tazilite perspective on **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** through three figures: **Wasil ibn Atha** (d. 131 H), **Ibrahim Al-Nadham** (d. 231 H), and **Qadi Abd al-Jabbar** (d. 431 H). However, this study does not provide a detailed explanation (*tafsili*) of the differences between **Qiyas Tamsili Ushuli** and **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid**. It concludes that **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** does not yield definitive (*qat'i*) conclusions, and those who use **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** in theology tend to incline towards anthropomorphism (*tashbih*). This is because, in order to deny the similarity between God and His creation, one must first consider their similarity, and from that, they conclude that God is not like His creation.²⁸ Another study, conducted by Hamd Allah Oways Abu Alhamd, titled "Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid between Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and Imam Juwayni and Their Approaches to Divine Attributes," concludes that the understanding of these two figures regarding **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** had an impact on their theological views. According to **Imam Juwayni**, the cause (*illah*) in **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** is an accident, meaning it exists in an entity but is not the entity itself (*qaim bi al-mahal walakin kharij anha*). On the other hand, **Qadi Abd al-Jabbar** holds that the *illah* is something that does not exist alongside the entity itself and is not a part of it. Therefore, the absence of an *illah* in something does not necessarily mean the law applies to it (*'adam qaim illah fi al-shay' mujib al-hukm*). However, this study does not touch on the *dhawabith* (principles) of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid**, which were proposed as a comparison between the two scholars, nor does it include a complete definition of **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** that encompasses its restrictive conditions (*mani'*) as a definitional requirement.²⁹

²⁷ Azizi, Mustafa, *Qiyas Ghaib Ala shahid Qimatuhu*, Jurnal Majallah Al Aqaid. 12.37 (2009), 1-42 < <https://doi.org/10.35632/citj.v11i44.1335> >.

²⁸ Hasan Al khataf, " *Qiyas Ghaib Ala Shahid wa dawruhu Fi Takwin Al Aql Al I'tizaly*", Jurnal Majallah Ilmiah alamiah. 11.44 (2006), 91- 128 < <https://doi.org/10.35632/citj.v11i44.1335> >.

²⁹ Hamd Allah Oways Abu Alhamd, "Qiyas Ghaib Ala Shahid Baina Al Qadhi Abd Al Jabbr Wa Al imam Juwayni Wa Itjahuma Nahwa Sifat Al Ilahiyah",Majallah Al adab wa'l Al ulum Al insaniah. 2.60 (2006), 87- 129 <[10.21608/FJHJ.2006.130765](https://doi.org/10.21608/FJHJ.2006.130765)>.

The literatures used in this research include: primary data, which encompasses two books, namely Sharh Ushul Al-Khamsah and Al-Mugni Fi Al-Abwab Al-Tauhid, while the secondary data includes all books, treatises, and journals that support the discussion. The methods employed in this paper are as follows. First, the author identifies the scholar under study and the formal object of focus, which is Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and his focus on the attributes of God and Ilm al-Kalam (theology). Second, the author collects and selects data, particularly the works of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and other books related to the topic discussed in this research. Third, the author clarifies the key elements related to Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid according to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's perspective. The collected data will then be processed and presented using a descriptive method.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is a method widely used by Islamic legal theorists (**Usuliyun**) and theologians to derive legal conclusions or rulings from something. The difference is that the **Usuliyun** apply it to human actions and the relevant Sharia texts, while theologians use it in relation to God's attributes. According to **Qadi Abd al-Jabbar**, **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** is defined as making a judgment about one thing based on another due to the existence of similarity between them (**fi ma yajri majra al-illah**) in both.³⁰ To identify the similarity between the two, it is necessary to consider them in their entirety. If we analyze Qadi Abd al-Jabbar's definition, it does not conform to the criteria of formal logic because its scope and limits are unclear. However, the fundamental difference between **Qiyas Tamsili Ushuli** and **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid** lies in the process of deriving the **illah** (cause) and the connection between the two. In **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid**, the process of deriving the **illah** does not always use the same method as in **Qiyas Ushuli**, where the **masalik al-illah** (methods of identifying the cause) are applied. The decision-making process in **Qiyas Ushuli** is necessarily speculative (**zanni**), while in **Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid**, used by philosophers and theologians to understand God, they rely on an **illah tammah** (a complete cause inseparable from its effect), resulting in a definitive (**qat'i**) conclusion in the reasoning process.

According to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, not every similarity (*al-jam'u*) can be used as a valid cause (*illah*) in Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid, because simply identifying one similarity between God and humans could lead someone to equate God with creation absolutely and arbitrarily.³¹ Therefore, in Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid, a universal principle that encompasses particular details must be established. Using the typical *masalik al-illah* (methods of identifying the cause) employed by legal theorists (*usuliyun*) is not sufficient because it produces only speculative (*zanni*) results.

³⁰ Abd Al jabar, *Al Majmu' Fi Al Muhith Bi Al Taklif*, Vol.1 (Beirut: Al Matbaah Al kathulikiyah, 2007), 201.

³¹ Op,cit. Vol.2 46.

Furthermore, the subjects discussed in theology differ from propositional logic, as God and His creation are fundamentally distinct. Thus, it is necessary to formulate dhawabith (principles) based on both logical and scriptural evidence (dalil). According to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the principles (dhawabith) of Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid in identifying the illah can be understood from several aspects.

1. Similarity in Indication (Al-Ishtirak fi al-Dilalah)

The meaning of similarity in indication (dilalah) here refers to deriving evidence (istidlal) about attributes by using human understanding and linguistic approaches, while still attributing positive attributes to God (tanzih). For example, if one affirms God's omnipotence (al-qudrah) as a necessary attribute of God, then it follows that God is capable of performing possible actions (thubut shihah al-fi'il),³² since the ability to act is a consequence of the attribute of omnipotence. Similarly, according to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, seeing God is impossible unless the object of vision is limited, because linguistically, something can only be seen if it exists in a personified form (intiba' al-shay'). If God could be seen in the afterlife, it would imply that He is limited and could also be seen in this world.³³

2. Similarity in Cause (Al-Ishtirak fi al-Illah)

The meaning of similarity in cause here refers to the fact that both propositions share something in common, which makes the ruling applicable to the asl (original case) and also to the furu' (derived case). According to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the illah (cause) can also lead to the transfer of a ruling from the asl to the furu'. This transfer is necessary (wujub) because the illah represents the essence (jauhar) of an entity, existing within it by itself and not as an accidental property. Thus, something can be said to be inherently good or bad based on its essence, not because of a judgment or law that regulates it. Qadi Abd al-Jabbar explains that good and bad exist within the essence of things themselves and are not merely accidental or conceptual qualities. Therefore, it is impossible for God to do evil or be unjust to His servants, because God knows the inherent badness of such actions, not because of any external reason, but because the actions are bad in and of themselves. Just as a rational and morally responsible human understands the nature of evil and strives to avoid it for themselves and others, so too does God, with His knowledge, know the inherent nature of evil and is incapable of committing it.³⁴

³² Op. cit. Vol.1. 144. See Also: Abi Alhasan Abd Al Jabbar, *Al mughni Fi Abwab Al Tauhid Wal Al Adl*, Vol. 11 (Cairo: Dar Al Mishriyah, 1981), 61-71.

³³ Abd Al jabar, *Al Majmu' Fi Al Muhith Bi Al Taklif*, Vol.1 (Beirut: Al Matbaah Al kathulikiyah, 2007), 166.

³⁴ Abd Al jabbar, *Sharh Ushul Al khomsah* (cairo: Maktabah Al wahbah, 1996), 123.

Qadi Abd al-Jabbar distinguishes between the similarity in cause (illah) and the similarity in indication (dilalah) in a given matter. According to him, similarity in dilalah in Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is derived from a single indication that applies to two propositions. For example, the evidence of someone's ability (qadir) is their potential and actual capacity to perform an action. On the other hand, similarity in illah is the process that results from reasoning based on what is observable (shahid), leading to a ruling about it, and from that ruling, one analogizes it to what is unobservable (ghaib). This means that the process of searching for and affirming a cause (masalikul illah) to make an analogy to the unseen still requires external evidence.

3. Similarity in something that occupies the position of the cause (al-ishtirak fima yajri majra illah)

This refers to equating the ruling on the observable (al-shahid) with the unobservable (al-ghaib) because there is something similar between them. For instance, we axiomatically understand the meaning (tashawur) of will and wisdom (iradah wa hukm) within ourselves, and from that, we conclude that someone among us is wise in their will. This is known based on that person's concrete actions, which indicate their wisdom. The conclusion is drawn through observation of what is concrete (shahid), and from that, we logically assume that the same applies to what is unobservable (ghaib).

This is different from the previous reasoning process, where the search for the illah involved a process of selection (al-jam'u wa al-man'u) in which the illah was chosen through reasoning. Here, the process is different. The distinction also lies in the nature of al-shahid and al-ghaib: in the observable realm, the characteristics of an entity are perceived intuitively and axiomatically, whereas in the unobservable, they are inferred through reasoning. The illah here must be complete (tammah) and inseparable from its effect, like the sun is inseparable from its light, unlike a deficient cause (illah naqis), which does not necessarily entail unity with its effect. For example, the validity of prayer depends on purification, meaning the prayer's validity depends on the person being in a state of purity, but being in a state of purity does not automatically obligate the person to pray.

Similarly, fire is the cause (al-muqtada) of burning an object, but it is also intuitively known that an object will burn only if it comes into contact with the fire (al-mumasah). The mere existence of the object and fire is not enough to cause burning. Additionally, if the object is wet (wujud al-mani'), it cannot catch fire.

4. Hyperbole with positive attributes (ablagh ma'a tanzih)

In this process, both the observable (al-shahid) and the unobservable (al-ghaib) are not judged based on the illah or the attributes they share, but rather this reasoning is based on the idea that what is unobservable possesses a greater degree

of excellence (mubalaghah) than what is observable. For example, if humans seek goodness and strive to be the best (salah wa al-aslah), then surely God, who is the Most Wise, will act in the best interest of His servants. Likewise, in the concrete realm (al-shahid), the obligation to do good and avoid evil is something known to everyone. Knowledge itself may either be speculative (dzan) or certain (al-'ilm),³⁵ but in this case, it makes no difference whether the knowledge is speculative or certain. A person, with their knowledge, knows that they must do good and avoid evil. If that is the case, then it is even more certain that God, with His eternal knowledge, knows what is good and will do good.

This type of reasoning is weak because the *asl* (original case) and *furu'* (derived case) are inherently different from each other, so such reasoning does not lead to a definitive conclusion but rather only speculation (dzan). However, in practice, the Qur'an and Hadith provide many examples of such reasoning. The Qur'an explains that worshiping God is better than engaging in trade and seeking worldly gain, which is temporary.³⁶ If trade and seeking worldly life can bring great profit and sustenance, then surely God, the Creator of the universe, who is the source of all sustenance, has even more power to provide more abundant sustenance to His servants (khairu al-raziqin). Similarly, with God's omniscience and omnipotence, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar believes that God cannot know through knowledge (alim bi al-'ilm) because, if that were the case, the hyperbole would arise from comparing one thing with another, implying a similarity in essence and nature, resulting in two identical propositions.³⁷ Therefore, according to him, hyperbole (mubalaghah) must always adhere to the principle of *tanzih* (God's transcendence), meaning that even if there is a comparison (*tafdhil*), it is not a real comparison but rather a form of praise that cannot be expressed by humans except through such words.

The Qur'an also explains that God is the best of those who plot (*khair al-makirin*). According to Ibn Abbas and several commentators, the meaning of plotting here refers to *istidraj*, meaning that God deliberately allows the Quraysh to plot against the Prophet, only to later punish them with severe torment. Ibn Abbas explains that when the Quraysh gathered at Dar al-Nadwa to discuss what actions to take against the Prophet because his message was disturbing the stability of Meccan society, Iblis appeared to them in the form of an old man from Najd and incited them to plot, as they had done before.³⁸ Qadi Abd al-Jabbar considers this interpretation to be incorrect because the manifestation of Iblis in human form could either be due to God's will or Iblis' own action. If it occurred due to God's action, it

³⁵ Abd Al jabar, *Al Majmu' Fi Al Muhith Bi Al Taklif*, Vol.1 (Beirut: Al Matbaah Al kathulikiyah, 2007), 168.

³⁶ Qur'an 62:11

³⁷ Abi Alhasan Abd Al Jabbar, *Al mughni Fi Abwab Al Tauhid Wal Al Adl*, Vol. 11 (Cairo: Dar Al Mishriyah, 1981), 352.

³⁸ Fakr Al din Al Razi, *Mafatih Al ghaib*, vol. 15 (Beirut: Dar Al fikr. 2004), 152.

would be rationally impossible (mustahil 'aqlan) because God would not test disbelievers through their own plotting, as plotting in language means deception (al-ikhtiyal wa al-khida'), and by definition, it means doing something with hidden intent.³⁹ If it was Iblis' own action, it would also be impossible, because if Iblis had the power to change his form, it would contradict God's wisdom (hikmah Allah Ta'ala).⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is one of the methods widely used by theologians to explain God's attributes. Initially, it must be acknowledged that Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid in theology is similar to Qiyas Tamsili in usul al-fiqh. However, in practice, there is a fundamental difference in the use of Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid in understanding God's attributes because the distinction between the observable (al-shahid) and the unobservable (al-ghaib) means that one cannot apply the same ruling to both. Nonetheless, ignoring this method in theological reasoning (istidlal kalam) is not possible because it is used in many religious texts.

According to Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the fundamental difference between the two lies in the illah (cause). In Qiyas Ushuli, the illah is derived from the masalik al-illah (methods of identifying the cause), which is different from the had awsath in logical analogy (qiyas mantiqi). As a result, the conclusion reached through this process is speculative (dzan). However, in Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid, particularly in understanding God's attributes, the illah here is a complete illah tammah. From this understanding, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar views something as inherently evil because of its essence, just as something is inherently good, not because it is accidental or judged to be so by external laws or evaluations. Hence, it cannot be separated from its effect (ma'lul), making it appropriate for analogizing the unobservable. Therefore, the conclusion derived from this analogy leads to certain knowledge (yaqin). From this, we can conclude that Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid is a valid argument (hujjah) in theology, particularly in understanding God's attributes.

Qadi Abd al-Jabbar also explains that not every Qiyas Ghaib ala Shahid must be based on existing dhawabith (principles), because without them, one might conceptualize God according to what they observe and the concrete things around them. According to him, there are four dhawabith: Hyperbole with Positive Attributes (Ablagh Ma'a Tanzih), Similarity in Something that Occupies the Position of the Cause (al-ishtirak fima yajri majra illah), Similarity in the Cause (al-ishtirak fi al-illah), and Similarity in Conditions.

³⁹ Jalal Al Din Al suyuthi, *Mu'jam Maqalid Fi Al hudud Wa al rusum* (Cairo: Maktabah Al adab, 2004), 208.

⁴⁰ Abil Alhasan Abd Al Jabr, *Tafsir Qadi Abd Al jabbar*, (Beirut: Dar Al Kotoob Al Ilmiyah, 2009), 202.

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